Using hand-collected data, we find that activist shareholders often publicly disclose open letters that demand various changes in corporate operating decisions at their target firms. These letters are associated with significant stock price movements, decreased bid-ask spreads, and key activism outcomes such as directorship wins, corporate strategy shifts, and proxy advisor recommendations. 
Introduction
Verrecchia (1983) predicts that managers' voluntary disclosures are typically induced by compensation contracts based on outcomes such as stock price. Empirical research has therefore linked voluntary disclosure actions to managerial stock compensation (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003) . However, Jung and Kwon (1988) predict that managers' voluntary disclosures can also be induced by the informative disclosures of third parties. We therefore empirically assess corporate governance theories that model activist shareholders as investors who may publicly disclose information about their agenda in order to mitigate information asymmetry among investors (e.g., Cohn and Rajan, 2013; Harris and Raviv, 2010) . Specifically, we analyze investor response to activists' open letters and how managers respond through their own voluntary disclosure choices.
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Following Cohn and Rajan (2013) , our main conjecture is that activists possess private knowledge about their agenda at a target firm, and that this agenda is not common knowledge among investors (including managers). For example, an activist may have an agenda to alter a target's future corporate operating decisions. Thus, activists may elect to publicly disclose information about their agenda in order to gain the support of other investors. Consistent with this idea, we observe that activists commonly publicly release open letters on how operations can be improved at their targets, and these letters often seek support from other shareholders for this agenda (see Section 2 and Appendix 1 for examples).
At the same time, Khorana et al. (2017) observe that not all activists make public disclosures. To help explain this result, we conceptually expand the basic cost-benefit framework from classical disclosure theory to an activist's disclosure choice (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983) . Disclosure costs for activists may include a decrease in their relative information advantage and their uncertainty about how the market will react to their disclosures. Disclosure benefits may include its facilitating of activists' persuasion and coordination efforts among investors. Second, open letters may signal to investors that there is a fundamental change in the activist campaign. More importantly, activists' reputation and credibility, as well as the extent to which they reveal new information in their disclosures, will likely further impact whether their disclosures ultimately have meaningful economic consequences such as stock price and bid-ask spread effects. 2 We therefore start our analysis by hand collecting a large sample of activists' open letters from 2012 to 2014 and using several market measures to assess their information content. also expect these letters to impact adverse selection in trade. We therefore complement returns with DTAQ bid-ask spreads.
We first find significant unsigned returns of 4.0 percent for the [−1, +1 day] interval, where day 0 is the release date of the activist open letter. As we widen the return interval in both directions, the magnitude of the effect increases and remains significant, which suggests that these returns are not sentiment driven. We then assess signed returns and find significant returns of +2.4 percent for the [−1, +1 day] interval; this effect also strengthens as we widen the return interval. 4 Moreover, both unsigned and signed returns increase more for activists who have a stronger reputation in the market, as proxied for by AUM. We also find that both unsigned and signed returns are significantly different from zero when we set the return window to day 0 alone. This analysis and those that follow control for a variety of firm-level and activist-level attributes. We also take steps to ensure that all of our findings are not confounded by other information events such as corporate disclosures, analyst forecasts, the initial announcement of the activist campaign, and 13D filings.
We next build on the prior result by testing whether activists' open letters are associated with investor information asymmetry, as proxied for by DTAQ percent bid-ask spreads.
To the extent that activists' open letters reveal to other investors new information about a target's value, we would expect these letters to impact information asymmetry among investors. In theory, the direction of this result depends on whether open letters decrease an activist's relative information advantage or prompt other investors to collect more private information about a target (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994) .
We find that for the [−1, +1 day] interval around the open letter release date, mean percent bid-ask spreads decrease by about 1.7 percentage points relative to a control period.
We also find similar results for [−5, +5 days] and for day 0 alone. 5 Taken together, our returns and spread findings suggest that activists' open letters are informative to investors and decrease investor information asymmetry.
We next link activists' open letters to key outcomes of their campaigns. Although this analysis extends beyond the scope of the theoretical prediction that activists may make informative disclosures, it speaks to the important question of what benefits accrue to ac- 4 We find similar results for raw firm returns and for a variety of other return benchmarks. By comparison, prior studies find that the initial announcement of activist campaigns from 2012 to 2014 is associated with a +6.23 percent CAR, and that "bad news" and "good news" management earnings forecasts are associated with −9.96 percent CARs and +1.93 percent CARs, respectively (Hutton et al., 2003; Khorana et al., 2017, Figure 2) . Thus, our magnitudes appear to be reasonable. We show further in Section 4.2 that our magnitudes relate well to those in the activism literature. 5 In Section 3, we take several steps to ensure that we are capturing the information asymmetry component of spreads and not the order processing component. As we discuss further in Section 2, the channels through which managers often respond to activists may include 8-K press releases and voluntary amendments to proxy materials (i.e., SEC form DEFA14A). Accordingly, we test and find that managers' 8-K filings increase significantly after the release date of activists' open letters, relative to a control period.
We also test and find that DEFA14A filings increase significantly after the release date of activists' open letters, relative to a control period.
7 To account for potential calendar-time patterns in 8-K and DEFA14A filings, we employ a variety of control periods and find similar results throughout. Overall, these findings suggest that managers' voluntary disclosures can be induced by activists, perhaps as managers attempt to shape the public narrative about 6 Since we cannot isolate a strong instrument for open letters, we can only analyze the circumstances in which it is optimal for activists to release open letters. An alternative hypothesis is that activists release open letters to manipulate a target's stock price or to achieve some other goal. Our evidence does not support these hypotheses. Also, as Appendix 1 shows, open letters can make many demands; one letter in our sample makes over 50. Our activism outcomes only summarily capture significant changes in a target. See Section 3 for more detail on this feature of our analysis.
7 Cooper et al. (2017) and Lerman and Livnat (2010) find that firms' press releases are often filed in 8-Ks. We therefore design our 8-K measure to capture these voluntary disclosures. Note that we do not use management forecasts because these may arise from corporate operating decisions unrelated to open letters. This is not as much of a concern with 8-Ks and DEFA14As. their firm as it relates to activists' letters.
To summarize, theory predicts that activists may use public disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry among investors, and that managers may respond to these disclosures.
Consistent with this idea, we find that activists' open letters are informative to investors, as evidenced by significant stock price reactions and decreased bid-ask spreads around their release dates. We also find that activists' open letters are leading indicators of key activism outcomes. Managers appear to respond to open letters with increased voluntary disclosure of their own. These findings obtain across a variety of specifications and are validated by several placebo tests and the use of control firms.
Our findings make several contributions to the literature. First, the seminal study by Verrecchia (1983) predicts that managers' voluntary disclosures are typically induced by compensation contracts based on outcomes such as stock price. Empirical research has therefore linked voluntary disclosure to managerial stock compensation (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003) . However, Jung and Kwon (1988, p. 147) predict that third-party disclosures can also trigger managers' reaction function. Consistent with this idea, our findings suggest that some managers' voluntary disclosure choices are driven by activists' disclosures. Second, our findings have corporate finance implications to the extent that activists' open letters impact stock price, information asymmetry, and management disclosures, and thus a firm's cost of capital (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011) . Relatedly, we also complement theoretical research that links the cost of capital to management disclosures. These studies can be conceptually expanded to the disclosures made by any party, including shareholders (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . Indeed, there have been calls for additional research on the economic effects of disclosures made by third parties (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010, p. 297) .
Third, our findings complement standard price-setting models that assume that investors act on information solely by trading in company shares (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) . We show that this is not the case for all investors: some investors elect to release some of their information publicly. In this respect, we complement Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) , who study 124 short-sales and find that short sellers facilitate downward price pressure by releasing unfavorable reports about their shorted firms. We also extend Back et al. (2018) and Edmans (2009) by showing that activists may be able to alter a target's stock liquidity by actions other than trading, such as public disclosure.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background and motivates our hypotheses in light of prior literature. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 provides our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Background and Hypothesis Motivation
In 2017, activist funds managed over $120 billion in assets and attracted nearly a quarter of all hedge fund flows (Khorana et al., 2017) . The increasing presence of activists in the financial markets has spawned a considerable number of studies on their activities (e.g., Brav et al., 2015; Edmans and Holderness, 2017) . In particular, recent theoretical studies model how activists' information dissemination activities may help to facilitate their campaigns (e.g., Cohn and Rajan, 2013; Harris and Raviv, 2010) . However, these theories remain largely untested.
At the start of an activist's campaign, other investors in the target are inherently uninformed about an activist's agenda. This feature of activism drives the basic theoretical result that activists possess private knowledge about a target that creates problematic information asymmetry among investors. One key prediction from these models is that activists may publicly disclose information about their agenda in order to decrease this information asym- Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) .
Conversely, some investors may respond to activists' open letters by collecting more private information, thereby increasing adverse selection and information asymmetry in tradee.g., larger bid-ask spreads (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994 investors (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2007) . Another possibility is that the benefit to managers of responding might not exceed any proprietary disclosure cost, or some other private benefit of not responding (e.g., Bernard, 2016) . For example, managers may wish to maintain their private information advantage or to extract personal benefits from nondisclosure, as when their compensation is linked to stock price (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003) . Also, more disclosure may facilitate litigation or further advantage activists (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Kothari et al., 2009 ).
These considerations lead to our final hypothesis, stated in the null:
H4: Managers do not respond to activists' open letters with disclosures of their own.
Overview of Data
We identify activists' open letters by using Dow Jones Factiva to search a variety of media outlets. Our reading of these letters suggests that virtually all of them are aimed at a target's board, management, or other shareholders-or some combination of these. We therefore use the following search form in Factiva: ("public letter" or "in a letter" or "open letter" or "in a recent letter" or "in its letter" or "sent a letter" or "wrote a letter" or "filed a letter" or "issued a letter" or "delivered a letter" or "released a letter" or "to a letter sent"
or "their letter") not ("buffett" or "obama"). To analyze whether activists' open letters correspond to a target firm's stock price movements, information asymmetry, and disclosures, we manually link our sample to CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S. We lose 9 observations that cannot be linked to all three of these databases.
For our returns analyses in H1, we compute abnormal returns as raw firm returns minus value-weighted market returns over our respective return intervals. We find similar results when we adjust raw firm returns by equal-weighted market returns, when we use raw firm returns, and when we compute various factor-based alphas (e.g., Hutton et al., 2003, fn. 19 ).
To measure information asymmetry for H2, we follow prior studies and use DTAQ abnormal percent bid-ask spreads to approximate the information asymmetry component of spreads (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Holden and Jacobsen, 2014) . Foucault et al. (2013, p. 80) note that spreads are comprised of three components, including (1) the cost of trading with better informed investors, (2) the cost of holding stock in inventory, and (3) order-processing costs. Our primary interest is components (1) and (2), which are driven primarily by information asymmetry in trade (Foucault et al., 2013, Section 3.2.2) . That is, market makers' trading losses and losses on holding inventory both increase when they trade with better informed investors, as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . By contrast, orderprocessing costs are driven by settlement fees, trading technology, and competition in dealer markets, all of which are relatively stable from year to year (Foucault et al., 2013, Section 3.2.2) . Thus, since (3) is relatively stable over time and (1) and (2) 
where index f represents a target firm, and index t represents the day.
For each firm-day value, we follow Holden and Jacobsen (2014) to SharkRepellent. However, this only affects our analysis of H3. We still include some SharkRepellent data in our analyses for H1, H2, and H4. To do this without losing any observations, we follow Khanna et al. (2015 Khanna et al. ( , p. 1230 and create an indicator variable that equals one for observations that do not link to SharkRepellent, in which case we also set the SharkRepellent variables equal to zero (see Section 4). Our inferences are similar when we exclude observations that do not link to SharkRepellent.
12 We find similar results when we log transform one plus spreads.
For completeness, we include five measures of campaign success: (1) whether the activist wins a proxy contest at a target, (2) whether the activist attains a directorship at a target, (3) whether the activist achieves governance or strategic demands at a target, (4) whether the activist receives the recommendation of ISS or Glass Lewis, and (5) whether the activist successfully elicits a special shareholder meeting. Note that SharkRepellent defines "governance or strategic demands" as any governance or corporate operating decision that traces to an activist's agenda. As Appendix 1 shows, open letters can make many demands-one letter in our sample makes over 50. Our five activism outcomes only summarily capture significant changes in a target, which we consider a conservative approach.
To measure managerial response to activists' open letters for H4, we use disclosure filings from the WRDS SEC Analytics database. Our first measure is the frequency of 8-K press releases. Companies typically file press releases in voluntary 8-K items 2, 7, 8, and 9; we therefore limit our analysis to these 8-Ks (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Lerman and Livnat, 2010 ). However, we find similar results when we include all 8-Ks, which suggests our results are not driven by mandatory 8-K filings, which include those pertaining to a change in auditor, a change in shell company status, as well as other actions.
13
Our second measure of disclosure for H4 is the frequency of amendments to DEF 14A filings, or DEFA14A filings. DEF 14A filings represent proxy materials that are filed annually by all public companies. DEFA14A are voluntary amendments to the DEF 14A that can include additional information that is relevant to the proxy materials, including managers' views on activists' actions (see Section 4.5 and fn. 10 for an example).
To construct our 8-K measure of disclosure, ∆ on when firms release proxy materials (which is typically stable from year to year), the prior year control window is the strongest and most appropriate control window for our test. Our decision to use 90-day windows for both of our disclosure measures is motivated in part by Guay et al. (2016, p. 250) , who argue that managers need time (up to 90 days in their analysis) to observe investors' interpretation of new information and build a response.
Nonetheless, our inferences are qualitatively similar when we decrease the 90-day window to 60 and 30 days.
We also include a set of control variables. These variables include log of market value of equity, since firm size has been linked to returns and spreads (e.g., Chordia et al., 2008; Fama and French, 2004) ; ROA, since profitability has been linked to disclosure (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010); R&D and capital expenditures, since target firms more active in these activities could have more information to disclose; analyst following and institutional ownership, since institutions and analysts might affect disclosure (e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) ; and cash holdings, which could proxy for agency conflicts and thus affect how investors and managers respond to activists' open letters (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 746) . We also include SharkRepellent's proprietary "BulletProof" measure of managerial entrenchment at a target, since managerial entrenchment might decrease both the likelihood that an activist's campaign succeeds and the credibility of the open letter.
14 We also include activist-level attributes. These variables include the activist's ownership level in a target, since this may correspond to whether an activist's open letter is credible.
We also include activist AUM, since increased AUM could represent the activist's reputation in the market. The idea is that absent a strong reputation, investors would not invest in the activist to such an extent, which implies that AUM is at least a partial signal of the activist's reputation. Reputation in our setting could also be viewed through the lens of management, who might view more AUM as representing an activist's ability to enact his or her agenda because he or she has more resources to run a campaign.
In our regressions of spreads, we also include abnormal turnover, where turnover is measured as trading volume divided by shares outstanding (Chordia et al., 2000 (Chordia et al., , 2001 . This helps to ensure that our results are not driven by any trading activities that may be unrelated to the open letters. We also find qualitatively and statistically similar results for spreads when we control for abnormal dollar-value turnover, abnormal log of trading volume, and squared returns in place of turnover (e.g., Holden et al., 2013) .
Note that including the above regressors is unlikely to significantly affect our analyses of spreads and disclosure because our use of control periods in effect yields firm-fixed-effect regressions, which mostly eliminate persistent firm-specific factors such as industry membership. However, we still use these regressors to perform important static cross-sectional analyses of our results (e.g., size effects, etc.).
Also, since our control periods for spreads and disclosure are temporally close to activists' open letter dates, this procedure mostly eliminates the impact of any macro trends in spreads and disclosure that affect all firms. All variables are winsorized at the two percent level except for indicator variables. Variables that have a natural lower bound of zero (e.g., analyst following) are winsorized from the top only. All of our results are qualitatively similar when we do not winsorize and when we winsorize at the 5 percent level. For the regressions, we standardize the independent variables in order to facilitate interpretation of the intercept (see Section 4) . We provide the exact equations for all of our variables in Appendix 2.
Empirical Results

Univariate Statistics
Our sample period ranges from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014 and includes 255 activist open letters. As Table 1 , Panel A shows, the mean market value of target firms in our sample is about $20.7 billion; in sum, our sample covers target firms valued at about $527.9 billion. The mean target in our sample has −0.1 percent ROA, an analyst following of about 2, and institutional ownership of about 56.8 percent. The average activist in our sample oversees $8.2 billion in assets under management (AUM) and owns about 5.7 percent of target companies' common stock. On average, activists release open letters about 57 days after they announce their campaign, which suggests that our returns results are not mixing with returns around the announcement of the activist campaign.
15
On average and at the median, our unsigned and signed CAR measures are all positive, our abnormal spread measures are all negative, and our 8-K and DEFA14A measures are both positive. These findings provide initial evidence that activists' open letters are informative to investors, decrease investor information asymmetry, and elicit a disclosure response from managers. We assess these findings using multivariate specifications in the sections that follow. Fama-French industry groups are also well represented, with the most frequent industries being business equipment, wholesale/retail, health care, and finance. In sum, our sample represents a diverse cross-section of activists and target firms over several years.
15 Campaign announcement dates (but not open letter dates) are available in SharkRepellent for the 203 firms to which we can match our hand-collected sample. In Section 4.2, we directly rule out confounding information events using a comprehensive database of corporate disclosures and analyst reports. follows prior studies on corporate disclosure, most of which give investors at least several days to react to information releases (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Hutton et al., 2003) .
Stock Price Reaction to Activists' Open Letters
Likewise, activism studies typically analyze returns to the announcement of activism using return windows of up to 20 days (e.g., Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009 ). We show shortly that our returns results are not confounded by the announcement of the activism campaign.
We start with unsigned CARs. Unsigned returns are used extensively in the literature when the direction of the return around an information event is ex ante ambiguous (e.g., Bushee et al., 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2011) . Accordingly, in Table 2 , Columns 1 to 3, we regress unsigned CARs on target-firm-level and activist-level attributes. Since we are interested in the intercept term (or mean effect) and many of our independent variables never equal zero in our sample, we standardize the independent variables (but not the dependent variables). This considerably simplifies the interpretation of the intercept by eliminating the need to make a series of computational corrections (we apply the same procedure to the spread and disclosure regressions that follow). At the same time, this approach enables us to test whether our static regressors are associated with the values of our CARs (e.g., any size effect, etc.).
In Table 2 , Column 1, we find that the day 0 unsigned CAR is 2.2 percent (or 220 basis points; 1% level).
16 When we widen the interval in Columns 2 and 3 to [−1, +1 day] and [−5, +5 days] , the magnitude of the intercept increases to 4.0 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively (1% level for both). Taken together, these findings suggest that open letters are informative to investors, but they do not speak to the direction of investors' belief revisions.
Turning to signed returns in Table 2 , Columns 4 to 6, the day 0 CAR is +1. Among the other regressors, a target's market value is negatively associated with the CARs. One explanation for this result is that the credibility of open letters decreases in larger firms for which it is more expensive for the activist to enact change (Edmans and Holderness, 2017, Section 3) . Another possibility is that larger firms have richer public information environments to begin with, thereby making it costlier for the activist to acquire a considerable information advantage over other investors (e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007; Fama and French, 1995) . An activist's ownership level is also negatively associated with the CARs.
One interpretation of this result is that activists reveal less information through open letters in circumstances where they demand less support from other investors, i.e., when activists have more explicit control rights in a target.
To put the magnitudes of the above results into context, Khorana et al. (2017, Figure 2 ) find that the initial announcement of activist campaigns from 2012 to 2014 is associated with a CAR of +6.23 percent. Brav et al. (2008) (Hutton et al., 2003) . We next ensure that our returns results are not driven by confounding information events such as the announcement of the activist campaign.
We focus specifically on unsigned and signed returns for the [−1, +1 day] window, as this provides us with several days over which we can check for confounding information events.
To compile a comprehensive data set of information events, we first merge the full WRDS SEC Analytics database with the I/B/E/S management guidance and I/B/E/S earnings announcements databases. Note that the WRDS SEC Analytics database includes virtually all SEC filings by public companies, as well as 13Ds, 13Gs, and 13Fs. We also merge in the I/B/E/S financial analyst databases, including those for analyst earnings forecasts, price targets, and stock recommendations. This gives us a comprehensive set of potentially confounding information events, including (but not limited to) 10-K filings, 10-Q filings, 8-K filings, 13D filings, management guidance, and analysts' earnings forecasts. This approach also accounts for earnings calls, virtually all of which occur on earnings announcement days that will be identified by I/B/E/S earnings announcements.
We find that only nine of our observations have one or more confounding information 
Activists' Open Letters and Investor Information Asymmetry
Theory suggests that to the extent activists release part of their private information through open letters, this can change investors' beliefs about the mean levels and the priced covariances of a target's future payoffs. This is what the previous section tested using returns. However, theory also suggests that such private information revelation by activists may decrease adverse selection in the market for firm shares. This effect can be tested directly by analyzing a target's bid-ask spread (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985 close to the open letter date, this procedure mostly eliminates any macro trends in spreads that affect all firms. We provide our exact equations in Appendix 2.
In Table 3 , we regress abnormal percent spreads on target-firm and activist attributes.
Note again that since we are interested in the intercept term and many of our independent variables never equal zero in our sample, we standardize the independent variables (but not the dependent variables). This considerably simplifies the interpretation of the intercept term. At the same time, we recognize that our dependent variables are differenced, whereas some of our independent variables are in their level forms. This approach enables us to analyze static cross-sectional effects such as firm size, ROA, and cash holdings-measures that are not as amenable to differencing over our short windows. However, we do include differenced independent variables for other determinants of spreads such as share turnover.
In Table 3 , Column 1, we find that day 0 abnormal spreads are −0.013 percentage points Among the controls, log of market value is also significantly positively associated with abnormal spreads across the three tests, which suggests that open letters impact spreads less in larger firms. Similar to Section 4.2, this could be due to the fact that larger firms generally have richer information environments to begin with, which may increase the cost for the activist to acquire an information advantage over other investors (e.g., Fama and French, 1995) . We do not find a significant cross-sectional effect for activist reputation as proxied for by AUM.
We also perform a set of checks for confounding information events. In Table 4 , we tabulate our activist campaign success variables. We include five measures of campaign success: (1) whether the activist wins a proxy contest at a target, (2) whether the activist attains a directorship at a target, (3) whether the activist achieves governance or strategic demands at a target, (4) whether the activist receives the recommendation of ISS or Glass Lewis, and (5) In this respect, Brav et al. (2008 Brav et al. ( , p. 1751 and Zur (2011, p. 1742 ) recommend matching on industry and firm value. ple) using nearest-neighbor matching by industry and firm value, without replacement; i.e.,
Activists' Open Letters and Campaign Outcomes
19 As Section 3 notes, SharkRepellent defines "governance or strategic demands" as any governance or corporate operating decision that traces to an activist's agenda.
20 Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2011) are interested in matching hedge fund targets to non-hedge fund targets in order to compute the treatment effects of hedge fund activism. They recognize that there are no strong instruments for becoming a hedge fund target. Edmans and Holderness (2017, p. 542-543) similarly argue that there are no credible instruments for the actions of activists. we sort by industry and then by firm value. Both sets of firms must link to SharkRepellent so that we can obtain data on our five activist campaign outcome variables.
After matching, we then statistically compare activist campaign outcomes across the treatment and control samples. We do not mean to imply causality with our use of the terms "treatment sample" and "treatment effect." We use these terms only to simplify our discussion.
We provide our results in Table 4 There are caveats to these results due to the fact that we cannot isolate a strong instrument for activists' open letters. Foremost, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that activists release open letters when they anticipate that their campaigns will succeed. Indeed, our relatively large treatment effects suggest that this mechanism is likely operating in our setting at least somewhat. Thus, our findings should not be construed as the causal effect of activists' open letters on activist campaign outcomes. Instead, our empirical focus is on the circumstances in which it is optimal for activists to release their open letters, given the costs of influencing a target and its investors by other means. Nonetheless, this analysis is still important because if we discovered negative or no treatment effects in Table 4 , this may suggest that activists release open letters primarily to manipulate a target's stock price or to achieve some other goal. Our evidence does not support this argument. Table 5 , Column 1.
Manager Reaction to Activists' Open Letters
As in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we standardize the independent variables, which simplifies the interpretation of the intercept term. We again recognize that our dependent variables are differenced, whereas some of our independent variables are in their level forms. This approach enables us to analyze static cross-sectional effects such as firm size, ROA, institutional ownership, and cash holdings-measures that are not as amenable to differencing over our short windows. open letters. This is consistent with Brav et al. (2008) , who find that activists target low ROA firms more frequently. This finding is also more pronounced for targets with high institutional ownership. This is consistent with Appel et al. (2016) , who argue that institutional investors may serve as important partners to activists, thus increasing the pressure on managers to 21 Most press releases are included in voluntary 8-K items 2, 7, 8, and 9. As a result, we limit our analysis to these 8-Ks. However, we find virtually identical results when we include all 8-Ks. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 3 and fn. 13.
respond to an activist.
In Table 5 , Column 2, we re-run the regression from Column 1 except that we use [−90, −1 day] as the control period for 8-K filings. We find that 8-K filings increase by about 1 in the post period relative to the pre period (1% level), which is still economically meaningful but lower in magnitude than the result in Column 1. This finding suggests that any calendartime patterns in 8-K filings are not driving our results. As in Column 1, this finding is also more pronounced for firms with low ROA, attesting to the robustness of this result. Overall, our findings for 8-Ks suggest that managers are responding to activists' open letters with disclosure of their own.
22
We next analyze our second managerial disclosure measure, DEFA14A filings. DEFA14A filings are voluntary amendments to the DEF 14A that managers can use to disclose any additional information that is relevant to the annual proxy materials, including managers' views on activists.
23 Some investors can also file DEFA14As, but because our focus is managers' response, we do not include these in our analysis. Among the control variables, this finding is more pronounced for larger firms, who tend to disclose more regardless and who might have more experienced investor relations staff (Anilowski et al., 2007; Bushee and Miller, 2012, p. 45) . Capital expenditures are negatively associated with managers' disclosure response perhaps due to proprietary costs, although 22 Our focus is the information content of activists' open letters, so we do not perform market tests on managers' 8-Ks. However, prior research has established that 8-Ks are informative to investors (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Lerman and Livnat, 2010; Schoenfeld, 2017) . 23 For an example of a firm's response to an activist's open letter in a DEFA14A filing, see fn. 10.
this effect is economically small (Bernard, 2016) . Overall, our findings suggest that managers respond to activists' open letters through increased disclosure of their own, specifically through 8-K and DEFA14A filings.
Our use of 90-day windows for both 8-Ks and DEFA14As ensures that managers have enough time to respond. Indeed, Guay et al. (2016, Section 5.3) argue that changing disclosure policy can take up to 90 days because managers need to observe investors' interpretation of new information and build a response. Nonetheless, our inferences are qualitatively similar when we decrease the 90-day window to 60 and 30 days.
As we noted for spreads in Section 4.3, our approach of using changes in 8-Ks and DEFA14As is similar to using firm-fixed effects, in that it mostly eliminates any persistent firm-level factors that may be driving both types of filings (e.g., industry membership). Also, since the control pre period is temporally close to the activist open letter date, this procedure likely eliminates any macro trends in 8-Ks and DEFA14As that affect all firms. Nevertheless, we also find similar results when we include as a regressor contemporaneous changes in 8-Ks
and DEFA14As averaged over all other firms in a target's SIC industry. This regressor in effect serves as a set of control firms, which suggests that we are not capturing a general pattern in disclosure that is common to firms similar to a target.
We also perform several placebo tests to ensure that our results are not spurious. For 8-Ks, we run the same test in Table 5 annual calendar-time pattern, so we must go back and forward in one-year increments. In any event, we do not find significant changes in either of the filings for any of these placebo tests, which suggests that our findings in Table 5 are being driven by activists' open letters.
This increases our confidence that managers are responding to activists' open letters through increased disclosure of their own, thereby creating a public debate about their firm's future.
Conclusion
Voluntary disclosure is a key driver of many stock price properties and investor activities (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001 ). Verrecchia (1983) predicts that managers' voluntary disclosures are typically induced by compensation contracts based on outcomes such as stock price. Empirical research has therefore linked voluntary disclosure to managerial stock compensation (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003) . However, Jung and Kwon (1988) predict that managers' voluntary disclosures can also be induced by the informative disclosures of third parties. Relatedly, Beyer et al. (2010, Section 1) and Verrecchia (2001) suggest that the management disclosure literature can be extended to the economic consequences of the disclosures of other parties.
We therefore empirically assess corporate governance theories that model activist shareholders as investors who may use public disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry among investors about their agenda (e.g., Cohn and Rajan, 2013; Harris and Raviv, 2010) . We find that activists' open letters are associated with significant stock price movements, decreased bid-ask spreads, and key activism outcomes such as proxy contests, directorships, and proxy There are several avenues for future research on this subject. Disclosure studies often analyze either an economic agent's decision to disclose or the economic consequences of disclosure. We follow the management disclosure literature and first test for key economic consequences of activists' disclosures (e.g., Waymire, 1984) . Given our findings, future research could further analyze activists' disclosure strategies. Our matched-sample analysis is an initial step in this direction. Our study also focuses on activist shareholders in public companies, but one could conceivably extend our study to other market participants and asset classes, and to how managers respond. Future research could also examine other mechanisms by which shareholders communicate (e.g., Doidge et al., 2017) .
Appendix 1: Illustrations of Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014 (continued)
6. "CHANGE IS NEEDED AT WALTER ENERGY. . . Importantly, Audley Capital believes there is substantial value in Walter Energy that is not reflected by the current share price. Walter Energy has high-quality metallurgical coal assets in established mining jurisdictions with scope for significant growth, with a market position that should enable it to generate substantial free cash flow going forward.. . . Despite Audley Capital's confidence in the value of the metallurgical coal assets, we have been dismayed by the way the business has been run in recent years and the loss of stockholder value. For example, the share price has underperformed major mining indices, with the share price of Walter Energy falling 79% since its peak in April 2011 vs. only a 38% fall in the MSCI World Metals and Mining Index in the same period. This share price weakness as compared to the met coal average price decline reflects the uninspiring management of the Company.. . . In that vein, we firmly believe that a reconstituted Board-including Audley Capital's director nominees-would be best placed to execute on these value-enhancing steps. Audley Capital's director nominees include individuals with extensive experience in the metallurgical coal industry on an international basis and possess the skills required to manage multi-jurisdictional coal operations and their financing. We believe that they will bring a fresh, dynamic and creative approach to the Walter Energy Board.. . . We think that change is long overdue, and are disturbed that despite the loss of stockholder value, we see the Board taking no accountability for questionable strategic, operational and financial decisions. Further, the lack of consistent executive leadership is an underlying signal of lack of stability where it matters most. Both the pre-conversion shareholders and those that bought in the secondary offering are way under water. A number of shareholders have urged us to lead a campaign to enhance shareholder value. Therefore, at the earliest opportunity, we intend to (1) elect directors who are committed to managing the discount and providing a liquidity event, and (2) replace Kevin's firm with one that is less 'visionary' but that has a track record of making money for investors." April 10, 2013 (Bulldog Investors) 8.
"It is our belief that it is the responsibility of the Board, on behalf of the company's shareholders, to take advantage of such a large and unmistakable opportunity. Indeed, we believe that by choosing not to increase the size of the repurchase program, the directors are actually performing a great disservice to the owners, especially smaller shareholders who may not be in a position to buy more stock themselves.. . . In this letter, we have above summarized why we believe Apple is undervalued in order to express how ridiculous it seems to us for Apple to horde so much cash rather than repurchase stock (and thereby use that cash to make a larger investment in itself for the benefit of all of the company's shareholders).. . . We have expressed above what we believe to be the company's primary reason for not supporting our proposal. Conversely, it is our belief that Apple's current excess liquidity is without historical precedent and beyond reasonable comparison to its peers or otherwise, and such dramatic overcapitalization affords the company enough excess liquidity to repurchase the amount of shares we proposed. Apple's existing capital return program has just $37 billion remaining, and the company has until the end of 2015 to complete it. Without any changes to the program, the largest pile of corporate cash in the world is likely to grow even larger, and if the share price rises, this Board will have missed a great opportunity to use more of that hoarded cash to repurchase shares at an attractive value." January 23, 2014 (Icahn Enterprises L.P.) 9.
"We have chosen to take this opportunity to express our dissatisfaction with certain Board and management policies that we find detrimental to shareholder value. Such policies include the Company's: a) lack of an investor communication program; b) weak corporate governance; and c) overcapitalized balance sheet. We believe that these factors have had a deleterious impact on shareholder returns over a multi-year period. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of MicroStrategy's Board of Directors to pursue business and governance objectives that are in the best interest of all stakeholders (not just those that support the welfare of its Founder, Chairman and CEO). In our view, the Board has acted in a way that fails to meet a reasonable standard of fiduciary behavior.. . . Furthermore, this policy of blatant non-communication has directly resulted in the Company's current pariah status on Wall Street-with only 4 sell-side analysts covering the stock (3 long time MicroStrategy analysts recently dropped coverage). It is our opinion that the majority of institutional investors who take their fiduciary responsibilities seriously are reluctant or unwilling to consider an investment in a company that refuses to communicate with its shareholders." January 28, 2014 (Apex Capital, LLC) 10. "Dear Independent Members of the Board of Directors of Aaron's, Inc.: You will soon have to make one of the most important decisions in Aaron's history. In the coming weeks, we believe that Aaron's management will seek your approval for an alternative transaction that is very different from the open and transparent strategic review process that we and other shareholders have advocated. This transaction may be a share repurchase, an acquisition or something else; the precise contours are not important. What is important is that we believe that management's latest self-entrenching scheme will be nothing more than short-term financial engineering to temporarily increase earnings per share and mask the ongoing declines in system-wide profitability. If approved, this financial engineering will substantially increase the execution risk to Aaron's shareholders without any improvement to the company's core business. We hope that you will strongly question the logic of adding risk to Aaron's at a time when its core business is already badly weakened by over two years of failed strategies and empty promises.. . . We are confident that when you look at the facts and ask the hard questions, Ron's latest plan-like all of his prior plans-will not be the right direction for Aaron's." 
